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THE CONFIDENTIALITY RULE: A
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE WITH
REFERENCE TO JEWISH LAW AND ETHICS
Gordon Tucker*
I.

Introduction

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers (Rules) were
adopted in 1983 by the American Bar Association (ABA).' Rule 1.6,
one of the more controversial components of the Rules, treats the
subject of confidentiality between a client and his attorney. 2 The
controversy over Rule 1.6 centers on its failure to resolve the conflict
among the competing values of the individual's right to counsel,
the interest of society in a fair and accessible system of justice and
the need to preserve social order and citizen security. When competing
values represent important social and individual interests, as in the
case of Rule 1.6, a solution is particularly difficult to achieve.
Evaluating Rule 1.6 from the perspective of Jewish law can help
clarify these conflicts. Jewish law has different values from those
of our American system of law. An examination of the interaction
of these values provides guidance for evaluation of Rule 1.6 problems.
Jewish legal literature offers wisdom and experience gained through
its legal and ethical tradition.
In this Essay, Rule 1.6 is examined from a philosophical perspective. First, the Essay discusses the premises underlying the Rule.
Second, it evaluates the Rule according to the ethical standards of
our society and our legal system. The focus will be on Rule 1.6 as
it relates not only to the standards of contemporary American culture
but also to the standards set by Jewish law and ethics.
This Essay also examines whether there is any philosophical jus*
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1. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter cited as RULES).

2. See supra General Introduction to this series of Articles, note 1; see also
discussions of Rule 1.6 in the accompanying Articles within this book: C. Kelbley,
Legal Ethics: Discretion and Utility in Model Rule 1.6; A. Abramovsky, A Case
for Increased Confidentiality; D. Abramovsky, A Case for Increased Disclosure.
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tification for the principle of confidentiality in our legal system;
whether limits ought to be placed on application of that principle;
whether a balance can be reached between confidentiality and other
imperatives such as protecting innocent people from harm; whether
the distinction between "murder and mayhem" and other crimes is
relevant; and whether discretion can be left to lawyers when significant competing values are involved.
In conclusion, this Essay proposes that, when faced with prospective crimes that are likely to seriously injure life, limb, or
property, a lawyer should disclose information that he has reason
to believe may prevent the injury. In all other cases, particularly in
cases of victimless crimes, disclosure of privileged information should
be prohibited. Conversely, Rule 1.6 never obligates the lawyer to
disclose information and only permits disclosure in certain circumstances.
II.

The Principle of Confidentiality

To define the limits of confidentiality, it is essential to understand
the principle's foundations. Attorney-client confidentiality is an integral part of the American legal system. However, while some of
its sources are within that system, others lie beyond it in general
ethical principles. Sources for the principle of confidentiality relevant
to this Essay are general ethical principles of the attorney-client
relationship, implications derived from the attorney-client contract,
and certain fundamental guarantees of the United States Constitution
arising under the fifth and sixth amendments.
A.

The Attorney's Obligation to Protect the Client's Rights

Generally, one who is dependent on another can claim protection
from that person,' provided tfiat other obligations will not be grossly
violated by such protection. As physicians have a responsibility to
preserve the lives of their patients, so too attorneys have a responsibility to protect the rights of their clients. The attorney's responsibilities include the obligation to protect the client from self-

incrimination .4
However, preservation of confidentiality is not absolute. An obligation to protect a dependent cannot override the general moral
obligation to protect innocent human life. Similarly, if the lawyer's
3. The discussion in this section relies on observations made in S. BoK, LYING
158-64 (1978), to which the reader is referred for more detail.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3.
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responsibility to the client is partially derived from the client's right
not to incriminate himself, the lawyer's ethical obligation should be
no more absolute than the client's fifth amendment right. The client's
right to refuse to testify against himself cannot be invoked ethically
if it would place an innocent person in mortal danger. Rule 1.6 is
consistent with this reasoning since it does not provide clients with
an absolute right to confidentiality where the client's own actions
would place other persons in mortal danger.
B.

The Attorney-Client Contract

Another basis for the confidentiality principle focuses on unique
aspects of the attorney-client relationship. The confidentiality principle may be seen to flow from a promise, explicit or implicit, made
by the attorney in his agreement to represent the client. According
to this theory, the lawyer is not merely obligated to defend the
client from harm but also is required to honor his client's confidences.
According to this view there are limitations on the lawyer's contractual obligations of confidentiality. An individual cannot legitimately promise to do something which he is otherwise prohibited
from doing. A lawyer's promise to represent his client aggressively
cannot, for example, be construed as a promise to use falsified
evidence; to do so would violate his obligations as an officer of
the court. Similarly, despite the attorney's agreement to preserve his
client's confidences, ethical considerations preclude him from concealing certain imminent crimes from the authorities. Therefore, if
an attorney's promise to keep a client's confidence results in concealment of an impending crime, such promise cannot be construed
as valid and binding.
C. Confidentiality as a Safeguard of Fifth and Sixth
Amendment Rights
Another approach views the principle of confidentiality as a fundamental safeguard of the fifth amendment right to due process and
the sixth amendment right to counsel.' Given the adversary nature
of the American legal system, certain rights which are critical to
the system's fair operation must be afforded extraordinary protection.
For example, the right to competent counsel would be meaningless
without a guarantee that confidential disclosures will not be produced
by the lawyer in court. The right to confidentiality between the
5.

U.S. CONST. amends. V and VI.
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attorney and client, therefore, is inherent in the sixth amendment.
The significance of the sixth amendment right to competent counsel
and confidentiality should not be underestimated. For example, a
lawyer may be the only individual possessing information which
could be used to convict his client of a crime. The lawyer, as an
officer of the court, may be obliged to promote justice by aiding
the conviction of that criminal. Clearly, however, acquitting the
client or dismissing the charges against him for lack of evidence is
deemed preferable to infringing on the attorney-client privilege. The
decision is utilitarian: the damage done by failure to convict and
punish the criminal is considered less serious than that done to the
entire legal system by undermining the attorney-client relationship.
The rule of confidentiality, while safeguarding rights highly valued
by society, may threaten other valuable rights. This rule must not
ignore political, social, and moral realities which determine the nature
of our constitutional system. Therefore, the rules regarding the
attorney-client relationship should be consistent with such fundamentals of our system.
I1. Jewish Law-Some Basic Considerations
A.

Halakhah

Halakhah, Jewish law, is a system of codes and court decisions
which has developed over two thousand years. It is a legal system,
based on religion, which has been influenced by Jewish cultures
throughout the world. The emphasis of halakhah is on obedience
to the will of God, 6 as opposed to American law which emphasizes
compliance with a constitution. Since "the will of God" is difficult
to verify, there is no single way to validate the elements of Jewish
law. Some Jewish jurists use external standards, such as conformity
with antecedent moral convictions, to determine legal validity. Other
legal scholars have "periodized" Jewish legal history by according
greater weight to legislation and legislative history compiled before
certain pivotal dates such as the redaction of the Babylonian Talmud.
Like other legal systems, halakhah is an autonomous creation of
a particular society. It should be studied with many of the same
tools used to study other legal systems. However, the meaning of
halakhah is not always clear because there have been as many
6. For a discussion of how this emphasis in halakhah developed, including
case materials, see S.

PRESSER & J.

CASES AND MATERIALS

31-138 (1980).

ZAINALDIN,

LAW AND AMERICAN

HISTORY:
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halakhot 7 as there have been Jewish communities. Consequently, a
problem arises when the posture of Jewish law is sought on a given

issue. Nevertheless, there are instances in which the sources of Jewish
law provide a reliable expression of Jewish tradition on a given

matter.
B.

8

Sources of Jewish Law

The predominant source of Jewish law is the Pentateuch, or Torah,
which comprises the first five books of the Hebrew Bible. 9 In addition
to narrative, these books set forth codes of law.' 0 Some of the

statutes in the Torah are based on sparse text which has prevented
it from being considered a self-sufficient source of law. The Torah
is dependent on interpretation, or exegesis, to translate its economical,
often hortatory, style into law. Much of that task is accomplished
by Rabbinic literature which focuses on the Misnah, a comprehensive, topically arranged code of law" compiled in Palestine at
the end of the second century A.D.
The 'Mishnah provides detailed laws and regulations concerning

agriculture, the calendar, family law, all aspects of commercial and
criminal law, the structure of the judiciary, religious rites at the
temple and the synagogue, and the maintenance of ritual purity.
7. Plural for halakhah.
8. A further complication concerning Jewish law arose nearly 200 years ago,
when Jewish people all over Europe began to be recognized by the modern nationstates as full citizens. This process, referred to as the "Emancipation" by Jewish
historians, ended the centuries-old autonomy in civil, and sometimes criminal, law
which European Jewish communities had enjoyed in both law and fact. Now
unenforceable for all practical purposes, Jewish law has assumed a voluntary nature,
serving to highlight its religious aspect and eclipse its legal character. For one
thing, in the absence of agencies of enforcement (Jewish family law in the State
of Israel is a notable exception), the impetus for development and refinement has
waned. This is a fine example of how voluntary, as opposed to mandatory law
can suppress the development of a legal system. It is also an ironic outcome of
the "Emancipation," which was to some the ticket to the normalization of the
Jews. Of course, it did normalize Jews as citizens, but it simultaneously excluded
Jewish civilization. For a further discussion of the development and history of
Jewish law, see L. FINKELSTEIN, JEWISH SELF-GOVERNMENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES
(1924); M. KAPLAN, JUDAISM AS A CIVILIZATION 467-71 (1934); Baron, The Modern
Age, in GREAT AGES AND IDEAS OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE (L. Schwartz ed. 1956).

9. See Rosenberg, Biblical Narrative, in BACK TO THE SOURCES: READING THE
31-33 (B. Holtz, ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as BACK TO
SOURCES]. For a more complete discussion of sources of Jewish law, see Faur,

CLASSIC JEWISH TEXTS
THE

The Fundamental Principles of Jewish Jurisprudence, 12 N.Y.U. J.
POLITICS

INT'L LAW

&

225, 225-35 (1979).

10. See Greenstein, Biblical Law, in BACK TO THE SOURCES, supra note 9, at
83-104.
11. See Goldenberg, Talmud, in BACK TO THE SOURCES, supra note 9, at 131-34.
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Particularly significant are those laws which were not rendered moot
by the Roman destruction of the temple and of Jewish political
autonomy. The Mishnah became the basis for the more meaningful
and diverse legislation and juridical discussion found in the Talmuds
of fourth century Palestine and sixth century Babylon, as well as
later codes and case law up to the present day. 2
The Torah states that "[hie who fatally strikes a man shall be
put to death."' 3 The only procedure prescribed, however, is the
requirement that two witnesses are necessary to establish a case.14
Conversely, extensive description of criminal procedure detailed in
the Mishnah clearly provides that there shall be no state prosecutors
but only justices and witnesses. 5 Indeed, the Mishnah does not
provide for defense attorneys. That sanegor, the only word for
defense counsel in Rabbinic literature, is a word of Greek origin
indicates that the roots of this function are non-Jewish. 6
This lack of defense counsel does not mean that a criminal defendant is bereft of special protections. Rather, Jewish law provides
numerous protections for criminal defendants, including the abolition
of capital punishment for murder and other serious crimes despite
the clear biblical mandate for allowing it. ' 7 The Mishnah records
the following colloquy among early second century rabbis:
A court which executes someone once in seven years is called
"destructive." Rabbi Elazar ben Azaria said: "Once in 70 years."
Rabbis Tarfon and Akiva said: "Had we been on the court, no
one would ever have been executed." Rabbi Simeon ben Gamliel
said: "They [Tarfon and Akiva] would have encouraged murder
in Israel."' 8
12. The Rabbinic sources of Jewish law are described in Townsend, Rabbinic
Sources, in THE STUDY OF JUDAISM: BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS 35-80 (1972). In
-particular, Townsend directs the reader to English translations of Rabbinic literature

such as the Mishnah. Id. For a discussion of Rabbinic literature, see also
TO THE SOURCES, supra note 9.

BACK

13. Exodus 21:12.
14. Deuteronomy 19:15.

15. Mishnah, Tractate Sanhedrin ch. 4, 5.
16. In fact, nearly all the uses of Sanegor in Rabbinic literature are metaphorical.
A right to counsel, as we know it, is not part of Jewish jurisprudence. This
distinction is consistent with the differences between the American and Jewish
systems. The former is based on rights inherent in the formation of society, while
the latter is based on a common subjection to the divine will. This makes objective
truth, rather than protection of rights, the primary goal of Jewish law. Lawyers,
and the relationships they generate, tend to complicate that quest.
17. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Some of the procedures which
accomplished this de facto abolition are described in the Mishnah, Tractate Sanhedrin
ch. 4, 5.

18. Mishnah, Tractate Makkot 1:10.
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This exchange demonstrates the tension between the desire to
protect the accused and society's right to security. The choice of
Rabbinic Judaism was to err on the side of preventing executions
of innocent persons. Undoubtedly, that choice was made because
the threat involved in freeing possible criminals was, though real,
still intangible and provided only a potential for harm. By contrast,
an unjust execution was immediate and irreversible. 19
The simplicity of the criminal procedure mandated by halakhah
underscores a basic feature of Jewish criminal law, the emphasis on
the individual. It is an individual's guilt or innocence that is on
trial. In a capital case, his life hangs in the balance. General procedural rights tend to lose importance when confronted with the
specific facts and interests involved.20
The focus of Jewish law on the individual rather than the system
led to the creation of certain extraordinary procedures for safeguarding a defendant's life. This aspect of Jewish law was partially
inspired by the sobering observation that each unjust death destroys
an infinity of innocent generations; in the Rabbinic idiom, "one
life is equivalent to an entire universe." ' 21 However, juxtaposed with
this concern for protecting the individual is the special concern for
potential victims of a crime. The very ideology which led to the
Rabbinic abolition of capital punishment necessarily leads to the
conclusion that innocent life must be protected. Concern for the
potential victim overrides other more general and less immediate
considerations in the same way that concern for a particular defendant outweighs general apprehension about the security of society.
C.

Application of Principles of Jewish Law to Rule 1.6

The logic of Jewish law indicates that testimony which could save
an innocent victim should be compelled. Since biblical times, Jewish
law has insisted that everyone has a religious duty to testify as to
matters about which they have knowledge.2 2 Since the goal of Jewish
19. Jewish law may also have been stimulated to make this choice by the notion
that divine justice could be relied upon to protect society by overtaking and

supervising a freed criminal.
20. The Rabbinic emphasis on the individual went far beyond the Bible in this
respect, but it was not without important biblical antecedents. For a compelling
treatment of the premises underlying the criminal law in the Bible, see Greenberg,
Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law, in THE JEWISH EXPRESSION (J. Goldin
ed. 1970).

21. Mishnah, Tractate Sanhedrin 4:5.
22. This principle is stated in the Bible at Leviticus 5:1, and recurs throughout

Rabbinic literature until finally codifed by Moses Maimonides, a great Jewish
philosopher and jurist of the 13th century, in his code entitled Mishnah Torah,
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law is to determine truth and to punish guilt, failure to disclose
information is sinful. It would be particularly heinous if failure to

23
disclose resulted in the death of an innocent person.
The values and ethics underlying Jewish criminal law indicate that
a person possessing information about the imminent victimization
of another person must disclose that information if disclosure might

prevent or ameliorate the anticipated harm.2 4 Jewish law would

mandate disclosure even in the case of a lawyer and his client. This
conclusion is in accord with the three basic sources of the confidentiality principle. 25 First, while the dependency inherent in the
lawyer-client relationship may be a valid basis for the confidentiality
principle, it is clearly insufficient to outweigh the rights of potential
victims. 26 Certainly, Jewish law would concur.
The second source of the confidentiality principle is the notion
that an implied promise to keep the client's confidences stems from

the lawyer-client contract. Although some ethical contexts might allow
the implied promise of confidentiality to survive the conflict between
sanctity of the attorney-client relationship and the rights of potential

victims,

27

Jewish law probably would not. Since Jewish law is grounded

Laws Concernirg Testimony 1:1. An English translation is available entitled MAIMONIDES MISHNEH TORAH (P. Birnbaum ed. 1967) (Hebrew Publishing Co., New
York). See Goldenberg, Talmud, in BACK TO THE SOURCES, supra note 9, at 16172, 273.
23. Leviticus 19:16 states: "Do not stand by the blood of your neighbor." This
has traditionally been understood to mean that one is forbidden to allow an innocent
person to be harmed if the harm can be prevented.
24. "Jewish ethics" is the subject of some lively discussion. Su,.. -ommentators
claim that Jewish scripture contains an extralegal, supererogatory set of behavioral
norms, which are properly called "Jewish ethics." Others maintain that all such
norms are automatically subsumed by the halakhah, via an "umbrella obligation"
such as "going beyond the letter of the law." The paradox inherent in the latter
position is obvious and noteworthy. Still other commentators assert that halakhah,
like everything else, must answer to an independent set of ethical criteria. This
issue is discussed in Lichtenstein, Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic Independent of Halakha?, in MODERN JEWISH ETHICS 62-88 (M. Fox ed. 1975). For
our purposes here, there is no problem with the ambiguity surrounding the term
"Jewish ethics."
25. See supra Section I1.
26. Looking at the dependency relationship between client and lawyer as the
sole basis of the confidentiality principle, the importance of victims' rights versus
the client-lawyer dependency is evident. The victim also depends on the lawyer,
since the lawyer has information which would enable him to prevent the crime.
Because both the client and the victim depend on the lawyer, and it is the client
himself who threatens the victim, the lawyer's duty to the victim should predominate
in this oversimplified scheme. Of course, where other bases of the confidentiality
principle are considered as well, the balancing of duties becomes more complicated
and a proper outcome is less clear.
27. A Kantian analysis, as well as some rule-utilitarian approaches, would fit
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in concepts which transcend the will of the people, it would not
allow a promise between two persons to override a universal obligation to protect innocent lives. Indeed, it is an unambiguous principle of Jewish law that one cannot obligate oneself to do something
which the Torah forbids, or to refrain from doing something which
the Torah mandates. 2s Thus, the universal obligation to protect
individual life, which lies at the heart of the Jewish legal system,
supersedes a lawyer's promise of secrecy. The promise of confidentiality would therefore be suspended in the circumstances under which
Rule 1.6 becomes operative.
The third source of the confidentiality principle is the constitutional
guarantee of due process and counsel. Since this source is uniquely
American, it does not create any special relationships or obligations
cognizable under Jewish law. Nonetheless, certain conclusions may
be drawn from this consideration of the confidentiality principle
from the standpoint of Jewish law. First, the ethical questions raised
when a lawyer knows there is a potential victim of a deadly crime
must be evaluated along with the rights of the client. Second,
promises of confidentiality must yield when they conflict with fundamental ethical obligations. Finally, the advocacy system is not the
only possible framework within which justice can be achieved. Since
this system is a means toward justice and not an end, the principle
of confidentiality, which is designed to facilitate the functioning of
the system, cannot be made the ultimate goal. The principle must
yield to other important principles such as protection of innocent
lives which all systems of law, including advocacy, must uphold.
IV.

Problems With Rule 1.6

The problems with Rule 1.6 as it is currently written include its
undervaluation of victims' rights, failure to distinguish adequately
between past and future crimes, arbitrary distinctions between forbidden and permitted disclosures, and failure to recognize that life
and limb are more important than the right to counsel.
into this category. Any good introduction to ethics will explain such approaches
in further detail. See, e.g., G. HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICs 65-77 (Kant), 152-63 (Utilitarianism) (1977).
28. This principle is articulated on many occasions in Rabbinic literature. One
such statement can be found in the Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Qiddushin 19b
(English translation, Soncino Press). It is also found in the medieval codes, for
example, in Maimonides, Mishnah Torah, Laws Concerning Marriage, 6:9. See
supra note 22. The principle is sometimes stated as follows: One is already foresworn
from Mount Sinai (the scene of the ratification of biblical law)-and therefore,
one cannot contradict that obligation by a later promise or oath.
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Rule 1.6 Undervalues Victims' Rights

Application of Rule 1.6 gives rise to a number of problems.
Consider two hypothetical cases. In the first case, a client tells his
lawyer, after consultation, that he is so upset about his legal difficulties that he intends to have a few drinks at the corner tavern
before driving home. The lawyer cannot dissuade him from committing the crime of driving while intoxicated. In the second case,
a lawyer learns that his client is about to defraud an elderly couple
of their entire life savings. In such a case, the existence of potential
victims conflicts with the principle of confidentiality and indicates
that the lawyer's responsibilities may change in response to consideration of the victims' rights. The case of the elderly couple is more
disturbing because it presents actual victims, as opposed to the
29
unidentified potential victims of the drunk driving hypothetical.
Rule 1.6 only permits disclosure in situations where the lawyer
reasonably believes his client will cause substantial bodily harm. The
Rule does not permit disclosure where the client only intends to
inflict financial injury or property damage. It is, therefore, problematic that Rule 1.6 would allow disclosure in the drunk driving
instance because it could potentially result in "substantial bodily
harm," but would forbid such preventive action in the case of the
elderly couple. The failure of Rule 1.6 to protect innocent persons
indicates that the rights of victims are being undervalued and that
the permissive disclosure rule should be made less protective of
confidential information.
B.

Rule 1.6 and the Distinction Between Past and Future Crimes

By forbidding disclosure of information concerning crimes that
will seriously injure property or economic interests, Rule 1.6 fails
to distinguish adequately between the role of confidentiality as applied
to past and prospective crimes. With respect to past crimes, there
is no dispute that a lawyer's responsibility is to protect client confidences. Under the exclusionary rule, for example, clearly probative
and incriminating evidence is excluded where it was obtained through
intentional violations of the fourth amendment. 0 Often, the injustices
29. This viewpoint does not deny that the victims on the road are actual, but
rather it asserts that there is some moral difference between cases where the victims
can be identified in advance, and those cases where they cannot.
30. Recently, the United States Supreme Court has made inroads into the
exclusionary rule by declaring that there is a "good faith" exception to the rule
where police violate fourth amendment rights in good faith, believing they have a
valid search warrant. This eliminates the purpose of the exclusionary rule which
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which result from application of the exclusionary rule, including
freeing a dangerous criminal, are striking.. However, the utilitarian
conclusion is that the long-term injustices resulting from infringements of privacy rights far outweigh the immediate ill effects of
the exclusionary rule.
In the case of the exclusionary rule, a crime has already been
committed and the victims have been harmed. To support the constitutional right to privacy, we choose to sacrifice the opportunity
to punish the criminal instead of preventing the crime. Although
releasing a violent criminal may result in future crimes, the risk is
only an undetermined, possible future event.
On the other hand, Rule 1.6 deals with actual victims whom the
lawyer can probably identify as those who will lose life or limb at
the hands of his client. However, toleration of an occasional failure
to punish criminals and of a risk of potential crimes does not mean
that the client's right to confidentiality should prevail in the face
of serious future crimes. Indeed, the idea that confidentiality as to
future crimes is inherent in the right to counsel is itself implausible.
The client's right to invoke the confidentiality principle exists to
ensure adequate legal representation with respect to alleged past
crimes. It is easier, morally, to deal with past crimes since it is no
longer possible to protect the victims. By holding a lawyer to secrecy
regarding an intended crime, the client is not exercising his right to
counsel but rather is abusing it.
C. Rule 1.6 Arbitrarily Distinguishes Between Forbidden and
Permitted Disclosures
Rule 1.6 draws the line between forbidden and permitted disclosures
at murder and mayhem but does not provide any compelling rationale
for doing so. If the ultimate purpose of Rule 1.6 is to uphold a
right to counsel through the confidentiality principle, why should
disclosure be permitted to prevent murder and mayhem but not to
prevent a poor couple from being defrauded of their life savings?
If murder and mayhem are treated differently because the duty to
protect innocent life and limb is more fundamental than the right
to counsel, why is there not also a higher duty to protect property?
Indeed, if the confidentiality principle cannot be construed to apply
to future crimes, then there is no rationale for drawing a line to
is-to deter police misconduct. See United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984);
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984); Supreme Ct. Rept., 70 A.B.A.
J. 110 (1984).
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prevent disclosure of any category of crime. Why should knowledge
of a major drug deal likely to victimize thousands of people be
considered privileged information? Once the right to effective counsel
is called into question for prospective crimes, any substantial infringement of third party rights, particularly those which are fundamental, should mandate disclosure.
D. Rule 1.6 Fails to Recognize that Life and Limb are More
Important than the Right to Counsel
Rule 1.6 gives the lawyer discretion to disclose information concerning imminent murder or mayhem, but does not require disclosure.
"A lawyer's decision not to take preventive action permitted by
paragraph (b)(1) does not violate this Rule."'" This position is
untenable. The criminal justice system, which is created to protect
life, limb, and property, should require its officers to disclose potential criminal homicide or mayhem. If, as Rule 1.6 suggests, the
duty to protect innocent life and limb outweighs the constitutional
right to effective counsel, Rule 1.6 should not be permissive but
should require the attorney to carry out that duty. If the victims'
claims are sufficiently serious enough to override confidentiality, they must
also override lawyers' discretion to decide whether to disclose confidential information.
Morally, Rule 1.6 fails to recognize that the sanctity of life and
limb is more important than the right to counsel. It is possible to
imagine a system of justice which is neither an advocacy nor a
constitutional system, and which, therefore, does not provide the
kinds of rights guaranteed by the sixth amendment, but which is
morally sound. Rabbinic criminal law is one example. However, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a morally commendable
system which does not contemplate the protection of innocent life
and limb as a premise.32 In fact, political considerations also demand
that the sanctity of life and limb take precedence over the right to
counsel. The Constitution guarantees the right to counsel. However,
the Constitution was designed to create a society in which people
would not be deprived unjustly of life, liberty, and property. Thus,
31. RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.6 comment (Disclosure Adverse to Client).
32. The two most familiar paradigms of ethical theories today are those of
John Rawls, on the one hand, and Robert Nozick on the other. See J. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
Despite the vast differences between these two approaches, both the "equality"
and "difference" principles of Rawls, and Nozick's minimal state agree on the
duty to protect innocent life and limb.
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in the political as well as the moral sense, the right to counsel
cannot outweigh the duty to protect life and limb. With respect to
the lawyer's implicit promise of confidentiality, it can be argued
that, because of the moral and political priority of the duty to
protect life and limb, the lawyer has no right to promise, implicitly
or explicitly, to ignore this duty. 3
V.

Proposed Revision of the Rule

The serious flaws in Rule 1.6 indicate that there is an urgent need
for revision. Considerations of Jewish law3 4 and American law un-

derscore the need for changes in Rule 1.6 so that:
(1) Serious victimization of innocent individuals is the dividing line
between disclosure and non-disclosure. Only such a distinction respects the compelling moral rights of individual victims, which are
35
basic to both American and Jewish law;

(2) A lawyer may not avoid his responsibilities as a lawyer and
as a citizen. If a moral claim is sufficient to override his professional
responsibilities to a client, the lawyer should not be given discretion
to respond to that moral claim. An alleged promise to maintain
confidentiality should not, as Rabbinic law explains, be construed
as a valid promise where it conflicts with superior moral claims.
As illustrated by Rule 1.6, a rule may reach its final wording
33. Failure to recognize the priority of the duty to protect innocent life can
lead to disturbing results. Several years ago, for example, in a New Jersey case,
a journalist had received information from sources to whom he had explicitly
promised confidentiality. See Wallwork, Government vs. the Public's Right to Know,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1979, § 11, at 22, col. 3. Defense attorneys in a murder trial
believed this information was vital to their client's defense. In order to protect his
sources, the journalist elected to go to jail rather than comply with a subpoena
for their identity. His rationale was that the freedom of the press guaranteed by
the first amendment would be hollow if the press could be hampered in its ability
to develop sources of information. See id. This rationale conflicts with the sixth
amendment right to compel favorable testimony. Even if courts would refuse to
convict a person who had been deprived of his sixth amendment rights, there still
remains the following troubling question: should a journalist reveal the information
on his own initiative in order to prevent the unjust imprisonment of an innocent
person, even where the defense does not suspect its existence? Given the vehemence
and absolutism with which the press argued that case, it is plausible to assume
that many in the press would deny that the journalist has that responsibility. Given
their arguments, there is no reason to suspect that their answer would be different
if the possible execution of an innocent person was at issue.
34. See supra Section III.
35. This argument, obviously, would not apply to application of the confidentiality principle to victimless crimes, even if they had not yet been committed.
Nothing in the proposal that concludes this section affects the principle in such
cases.
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through a process of political compromise, resulting in a product
which confounds attempts to find consistency. Though the process
of compromise is natural and unavoidable, philosophical analysis
must look beyond that process to the moral and logical justification
of the rule, particularly when its application affects basic rights.
Accordingly, paragraph (b)(1) of Rule 1.6 should be revised to read:
A lawyer must reveal information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes it necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death, substantial
bodily harm, or significant infringement of property or privacy
36

rights of a third person.

36. This mandatory provision is similar to the new Confidentiality of Information
Rule adopted by New Jersey which reads:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of
a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation,
and except as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c).
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities,
as soon as, and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary,
to prevent the client
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer
reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm
or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another;
(2) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer
reasonably believes is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon a tribunal.
(c) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary:
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, or to establish a defense
to a criminal charge, civil claim or disciplinary complaint against the
lawyer based upon the conduct in which the client was involved; or
(3) to comply with other law.
(d) Reasonable belief for purposes of RPC 1.6 is the belief or conclusion
of a reasonable lawyer that is based upon information that has some
foundation in fact and constitutes prima facie evidence of the matters
referred to in subsections (b) or (c).
N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RPC 1.6.

